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Abstract: 
 
The growth effects of remittances are controversial, but their welfare effects are less so. This 
paper provides evidence on the effect of remittances on poverty in an unbalanced panel of 40 
high remittances economies. The endogeneity issue, driven by the possibility that remittances 
and poverty may have bidirectional causality, is tackled by a system estimation technique 
using the seemingly unrelated regression estimator (SURE) that not only allows both to be 
jointly determined but also allows the error terms of the simultaneous equations to be 
contemporaneously correlated. Using bootstraps, heteroskedasticty robust standard errors of 
the SURE regressions are reported and the estimates show that remittances significantly 
reduce poverty. On the other hand, remittances decline with the wake of widespread poverty. 
There is consistent evidence that remittances also decline with increases in health index of the 
general population. However, improvements in the health outcomes of poor people are 
associated with more remittances. Finally, there is some limited evidence that remittances rise 
with increases in educational attainments of the general population, but fall as the poor 
people become more educated. 
 
Keywords: Remittances, Poverty, Panel Data, Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE). 
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Remittances and Poverty: Panel Evidence from High Remittance 
Economies 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Remittances by immigrant workers are now an important source of funds for many 
developing countries and their inflows have been rapidly growing. During 2007 and 2008 
their growth rate was 15 percent; Ratha et. al., (2009).
1
 Barajas et. al., (2009) and Chami et. 
al., (2008) reported that during 2007 remittances through official channels were $300 billion 
in addition to unknown transfers through unofficial channels, which are estimated to be about 
40 percent of flows through the official channels. The ratio of remittances to GDP exceeds 1 
percent in 60 countries. Although a significant proportion of these inflows are for altruistic 
reasons to support consumption and the living standards of family members, some are also 
motivated by pecuniary gains and take advantage of the incentives offered by the recipient 
countries. For example, in India deposits by the nonresidents attract higher interest rates and 
are exempt from income tax. Similarly Pakistan and Bangladesh give incentives to increase 
remittances.  In 2008 India‘s remittance receipts are the highest at US$52 billions. Other 
countries with high remittances are China and Mexico. 
There are direct and indirect macroeconomic effects of remittances, but these are 
difficult to measure. Five main channels through which remittances have indirect growth 
effects are as follows. Firstly, a steady flow of remittances reduce volatility in output and 
volatility and growth are found to be inversely related; see Ramey and Ramey (1995), Kroft 
and Lloyd-Ellis (2002), Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003), IMF (2005), World Bank (2006) and 
Chami et al (2008). Secondly, there is evidence that remittances improve the development of 
the financial sector and development of the financial sector increases the growth rate of 
output by easing the credit constraints for investments; see Aggarwal et. al. (2006), Gupta, 
Pattillo, and Wagh (2007) and Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009). A third indirect growth 
effect of remittances is negative through its effect on the real exchange rate. It is found that 
the real exchange rate appreciates as  remittances increase which is also known as the Dutch 
                                                          
1
 Ratha, D., Mohapatra, S. and Silwal, A. (2009) “Outlook for Remittance Flows 2009-2011: Remittances 
expected to fall by 7-10 percent in 2009,” Migration and Development Brief , World Bank.    
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disease, and appreciation may have a negative effect on the growth rate; see Acosta, Lartey 
and Mandelman (2007), Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), Lopez, Molina and Bussolo 
(2007) and Lartey, Mandelman and Acosta (2008). Two other indirect growth effects of 
remittances, which received relatively less attention, are its effects on education and human 
capital formation and its effects on the investment ratio. Both human capital formation and 
investment ratio are generally considered to have positive growth effects. However, high 
remittances are also due to the emigration of a large number of skilled workers, which may 
actually cause skill shortages and the net stock of human capital may actually decrease. A 
similar negative effect on output is also possible if the recipient families substitute leisure for 
work, generally known as moral hazard. Therefore, it is hard to say a priori, as Barajas et. al., 
have noted, whether the positive or negative growth effects of remittances dominate. This is 
one of the reasons for the recent surge in the number of empirical works on the growth effects 
of remittances which are controversial.  
The aim of this paper is to estimating rather the welfare effects of remittances which are 
less controversial.  The main question the paper seeks to address is whether remittances lead 
to poverty reduction at the macro level. The second issue addressed is, if such poverty 
reduction effects are robust after taking into account of the simultaneity between poverty and 
remittances.  
There is a growing body of literature on the effects of remittances on poverty reduction 
that can be categorised into two parts. The first one is focused on understanding the effects of 
remittances across the household level using national survey data. The main issues explored 
here are delineating the effects of remittances on household income and expenditure on 
consumption, education, health etc. The second one is focused on understanding the cross-
country effects of remittances on poverty at the macroeconomic level using aggregate data.  
The focus of this paper is to understand the effects of remittance at the macroeconomic level 
and hence only the methodologies of the second strand of the literature will be dealt at length.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In next two sections the literature on 
remittances and poverty will be reviewed. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the 
literature on household level evidence and cross-country level evidence will be reviewed 
separately in sections 7.2 and 7.3 respectively.  Section 7.4 will discuss the empirical strategy 
and data. In section 7.5 the econometric results will be presented and in section 7.6 the main 
results will be summarised and the paper will be concluded. 
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7.2 Remittances and Poverty: Household Level Evidence 
In a survey on migration and remittances, Page and Plaza (2006) outlined several studies 
conducted at the household level using survey data which have confirmed that remittances 
allow the recipients to meet consumption expenditure over and above the subsistence level 
which have important effects on welfare and poverty. These studies confirm that remittances 
reduce poverty at the household level, and raise educational and health outcomes for the 
family with a migrant member. For example, Quarterly and Blanson (2004) find that 
remittances are contercylical in Ghana , rising with economic shocks and reducing poverty of 
the household; Adams (2004) has found similar poverty reducing evidence of remittances in 
Guetemala. Regarding the complementary role of remittances on educational attainment 
Hanson and Woodruff (2003) report that in Mexico children belonging to a migrant family 
has completed more years of schooling; Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that in El 
Salvatore the probability of school dropouts are comparatively less for those families with at 
least one migrant family member; Yang (2003) in a similar study finds that the fraction of 
Filipino children aged 17 – 21 attending school increases with a rise in remittances. On health 
outcomes of the migrant family‘s similar evidence are also found. Frank and Hummer (2002) 
report that in Mexico children born in families receiving remittances are less prone to be 
exposed to health risks at birth. Similar findings are reported in Hildebrant and Mckenzie 
(2005) who find improved child health outcomes for Mexican households receiving 
remittances from a migrant members in United States. They specifically report lower infant 
mortality and higher birth rates for these remittances recipient families.  
 
7.3 Remittances and Poverty: Cross Country Evidence 
The literature containing the cross-country evidence on the effect of remittances on poverty 
reduction is relatively new and empirical works in this area are relatively fewer compared to 
its household level counterparts. Data problems seem to have been deterrence in carrying out 
cross-country studies. However, pioneering works by IMF (2005) and Adams and Page 
(2005) which are also the earliest papers on this topic, have led to a construction of a standard 
database on international migration, remittances, poverty and inequality facilitating other 
researchers efforts to make enquiry into the dynamics of remittances and poverty in 
developing countries. Jongwanich (2007) and Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) have utilised 
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the same dataset mentioned earlier and estimated the poverty reducing effects of remittances 
for Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan African regions respectively. Using data from similar 
source, Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010) have analysed the remittances-poverty relationship 
for a panel of African countries. As far as the literature on the cross-country analysis of 
remittances and poverty is concerned, these five papers span most of it. Each of these papers 
will be reviewed shortly and for the benefit of the reader a summary of these papers are 
presented in Table 7.1. However, it may be important to mention two other studies carried out 
by World Bank (2006, 2008) on the development impact of remittances on Latin American 
countries. These two studies also analyse the effect of remittances on poverty on the macro 
level but their approaches have been indirect. While they do not restrain from acknowledging 
that remittances could help reduce poverty, but they argue that these effects are channelled 
through increase in economic growth and investment. Hence, rather estimating poverty 
equation, their empirical strategy has been involved in estimating growth regressions and 
estimating poverty reduction elasticity of remittances indirectly via growth. Since the focus 
of this paper is to estimate the direct poverty reducing effects of remittances, these two World 
Bank studies are not included in the survey.  
 
IMF (2005) 
This is the first study to have empirically assessed the cross-country effect of remittances on 
poverty reduction.  The dataset consists of 101 countries covering the period 1980 – 2003. 
The empirical strategy which has been adopted by most of these studies including IMF 
(2005) is to estimate a poverty equation of the following form: 
itijit
itititit
uREGIONbXb
REMRATbGINIbPCYbbP


54
3210
                                                           
)log()log()log()log(
  (1) 
The dependant variable is the log of some measures of poverty ( itP ). The independent 
variables are i) log of per capita income ( itPCY ), ii) log of itGINI  index which is a measure 
of inequality in the distribution of income and iii) log of remittances to GDP ( itREMRAT ), 
the variable of interest. itX  is a vector of other control variables like government policies 
etc., and ijREGION  is a dummy included to control for regional effects. IMF (2005) only 
controls for average level of per capita income and inequality, but does not include any other  
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Table 7.1 
 
Summary of Literature : Poverty and Remittances 
Study Specification Methodology Period Estimator Instruments 
Poverty 
Reduction 
Elasticity of 
Remittances 
IMF (2005) 
it
ititit
uREMRATb
GINIbPCYbbP


 )log(
)log()log()log(
3
210
 
Cross-Section, 
101 countries 
1980 - 
2003 
OLS None -0.20 
Adams and 
Page (2005) 
 
itijit
ititit
uREGIONbREMRATb
GINIbPCYbbP


43
210
)log(
)log()log()log(
 
Unbalanced 
Panel, 
71 countries 
1980 - 
1998 
OLS, 
Instrumental 
Variable (IV) 
Distance, 
Education, 
Political 
Stability 
-0.35 
Jongwanich 
(2007) 
ititit
ititit
uXbREMRATb
GINIbGRbbP


43
210
 )log(
)log()log()log(
 
Panel, 
Asia Pacific 
Countries 
1993 - 
2003 
System GMM Internal -0.28 
Gupta, Pattillo 
and Wagh 
(2009) 
 
itijit
ititit
uREGIONbREMRATb
GINIbPCYbbP


43
210
 )log(
)log()log()log(
         (1) 
 
itit
it
ititit
vREMRATbDUALb
DISTANCEbSCHOOLb
TRATbPbbREMRAT



 )log()(
)( )log(
)log()log()log(
11110
98
765
     (2) 
Unbalanced 
Panel, 
24 African 
countries 
1981 -
2003 
OLS, 
Three stage 
least square 
(3SLS) 
Simultaneous 
system estimate 
-0.13 
Anyanwu and 
Erhijakpor 
(2010) 
 
ititit
ititit
uXbREMRATb
GINIbPCYbbP


43
210
)log(
)log()log()log(
 
Panel, 
33 African 
countries 
1990 - 
2005 
OLS, 
GMM-IV 
Remittances 
Lagged 1 and 2 
periods. 
-0.29 
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policy variables or controls for regional effects. In this formulation, the study finds 
significant link between remittances and poverty reduction in their broad sample. The study 
finds that 2.5 percentage point increase in remittances ratio will decrease poverty by 0.5 
percentage point.  However due to some methodological reason the IMF (2005) may require 
some extra scrutiny. In reality remittances and poverty can be endogenous. Just as 
remittances can reduce poverty by raising income and smoothing consumption for the 
recipients, poverty could itself be a driving factor in determining remittances.  One approach 
to tackle this issue is to use instruments for REMRAT when estimating equation (1), which is 
the strategy taken up by Adams and Page (2005). 
 
Adams and Page (2005) 
The is first paper to systematically address the issues involved in assessing the poverty 
reducing impact of remittance is that of Adams and Page (2005). Firstly, this study puts a lot 
of painstaking effort into constructing a database on migration, remittances, inequality and 
poverty for 71 developing countries falling under the World Bank classification of ―low and 
middle income‖ economies. The dataset is unbalanced with 1980 being the earliest year and 
1998 being the latest. To estimate equation (1), the study uses three measures of poverty viz. 
i) poverty headcount ratio, ii) poverty gap and iii) squared poverty gap. These definitions will 
be addressed later. The per capita income (PCY) variable included in the poverty regression, 
is measured in two different ways. One is per capita GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
from national accounts data and the other is per capita survey mean income gathered from 
household expenditure data. Using these two alternate measures of income, Adams and Page 
(2005) separately estimate poverty reduction elasticities of both migration and remittances by 
regressing a variant of equation (1) controlling for regional effects and find that both 
migration and remittances reduce poverty at the macroeconomic level. As mentioned earlier, 
Adams and Page (2005) has recognised the endogeneity problem at the outset and has 
devised an approach to tackle the issue of reverse causality between poverty and remittances 
and migration. Their approach is to pursue an instrumental variable (IV) strategy to control 
for the endogeneity issue. Three instruments were used for both remittances and migration. 
These are i) distance from remittance-sending region to the source countries; ii) level of 
education measured as percent of population over age 25 that have completed secondary 
education in developing countries and iii) government stability measured by the ICRG index 
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of political stability. Instrumenting this way, equation (1) is estimated in two steps. In the first 
stage migration and remittances equations are estimated using the above three instruments 
and including PCY (both measures), GINI coefficient, and regional dummies as exogenous 
variables. In the second stage, instrumented values of both migration and remittances are 
included in the poverty regression to estimate their poverty reduction elasticities. Having 
instrumented for the endogeneity problem and controlling for income, inequality and regional 
effects, Adams and Page (2005) still find that both migration and remittances reduce poverty 
in the source countries. In particular, a 10% increase in international migration will reduce 
poverty by 2.1% and a similar 10% increase in remittances will lead to a 3.5% reduction on 
the level of poverty.  
 
Jongwanich (2007) 
This paper is slightly different compared to Adams and Page (2005) and IMF (2005) interms 
of its econometric exposition. The paper estimates a growth regression to find out the growth 
elasticity of remittances. Since the issue of steady state growth rate is involved, it is not 
appropriate to estimate a growth regression based on annual observations, which Jongwanich 
(2007) did. The paper finds no statistically significant relation between remittance and 
growth. However, both human capital and investment ratio are found to be significant in 
growth regression. Jongwanich (2007) then estimates human capital and investment 
equations with remittances as a regressor where the coefficient on remittances is found to be 
significant. Given these results, a poverty equation is estimated of the following form: 
itit
itititit
uXb
REMRATbGINIbGRbbP


4
3210
                                                                              
)log()log()log()log(
  (2) 
Where the variables are same as before except for per capita income (PCY) variable which is 
substituted with per capita income growth ( itGR ). The regional dummy is removed, as the 
paper focuses only on the countries in a single region viz. Asia and the Pacific. The paper 
uses control variables unlike the predecessors which are included in the vector itX . The 
control variables are human capital, inflation and openness.  In relation to poverty, the main 
finding is, a 10 percent increase in remittances will directly lead to a 2.8 percent reduction in 
poverty. Moreover, because remittances also affect human capital, there are some indirect 
poverty reduction elasticity of remittances via human capital and per capita economic growth 
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in equation (2). The indirect elasticity is calculated to be -0.15, i.e. a 10 percent increase in 
remittances will lead to an additional indirect 1.5 percent reduction in poverty. Jongwanich 
(2007) results must be taken with some degree of scepticism. First of all, the estimated 
growth regression is incorrectly specified and the issues involved in this matter are 
elaborately discussed in papers 4. Secondly, in the poverty regression, the paper totally 
ignores the endogeneity issue arising from the possible reverse causality between remittances 
and poverty, and rather treats remittances as totally exogenous in equation (2). This creates 
doubt over the estimated poverty elasticity of remittances in the paper. However, the idea of 
indirect poverty elasticity of remittances is correct and can also be used by other researchers 
in this area. 
 
Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) 
This is one of the recent papers written on the link between remittances and poverty which 
extends the work by Adams and Page (2005). Gupta, Patillo and Wagh (2009) (henceforth 
GPW) use an updated database on poverty and inequality compiled by the World Bank which 
consists of 76 countries based on poverty surveys. The focus of the paper is on the 24 Sub-
Saharan countries included in the database.  The paper starts with measuring the direct impact 
of remittances on poverty by estimating a regression similar to equation (1). Subsequently 
GPW build on the model provided in equation (1) by allowing poverty and remittances to be 
simultaneously determined as a system of equations and thereby controlling for endogeneity 
problem. GPW use the three stage least square (3SLS) estimator to estimate a system of 
equations where both poverty and remittances are endogenously determined as follows: 
itij
itititit
uREGIONb
REMRATbGINIbPCYbbP


4
3210
                                                               
)log()log()log()log(
   (3.1) 
itit
itititit
vREMRATbDUALbDISTANCEb
SCHOOLbTRATbPbbREMRAT


 )log()()(     
)log()log()log()log(
111109
8765
  (3.2) 
 Some of the variables used are same as before. However, in equation 3.2 the additional 
variables included are trade openness (TRATit ), average years of schooling for population 
over age 25 (SCHOOLit), distance (in miles) from remittance sending region to source 
country (DISTANCE), dual exchange rate market dummy (DUAL) and lagged remittances 
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ratio ( 1itREMRAT ). Note that, among these right hand side variables determining 
remittances, two of them, i.e. SCHOOL and DISTANCE have been used as instruments for 
remittances in Adams and Page (2005). The parameters b0 – b11 from equations (3.1) and 
(3.2) are jointly estimated a system using 3SLS. The results suggest that a 10 percent increase 
in remittances will, on average, lead to 1.3 percent reduction in poverty. This effect is much 
less than what is reported in Adams and Page (2005).  
 
Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010) 
This paper is the latest on the literature on the macroeconomic effects of remittances on 
poverty which focuses on 33 African countries over the period 1990 – 2005. The dataset on 
poverty and inequality in Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010) (henceforth AE) is obtained from 
the same source as in GPW. Interms of modelling and econometric exposition, there are not 
much improvements from its predecessors. A poverty regression based on equation (1) is 
estimated using OLS at first. The following control variables are added onto the poverty 
regression: illiteracy rate, trade openness, and inflation rate. The regional dummy is dropped 
but a single dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa is included. The results indicate a strong poverty 
elasticity of remittances. However, the OLS results can be biased because of endogeneity 
between poverty and remittances. As a result the GMM-IV two-step estimator is used to 
control for it. Remittances ratios are first instrumented in the first stage. Instruments used 
were first lag and second lag of remittances to GDP ratio. In the second stage the poverty 
equation is re-estimated with instrumented remittances. The final results show that a 10 
percent rise in remittances will lead to a 2.9 percent reduction in the percentage of people 
living in poverty. 
 
7.4 Data  
The data
2
 used in this paper is a subset of the updated database on poverty and inequality 
compiled by the World Bank which consists of 76 countries based on poverty surveys 
                                                          
2
 Poverty and inequality data used in this paper is taken from World Bank’s PovcanNet database, education 
and health data is taken from Barro and Lee. Rest of the data is taken from World Development Indicators 
(2008) CD-ROM. 
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beginning in 1980. The dataset is available at the World Bank‘s PovcalNet database. The 
sample subset used in this paper comprises of those 40 countries for which remittances to 
GDP ratio exceeds 1 percent. However, out of these 40 countries, Belgium, Mauritius and 
Portugal do not have any poverty data available in the PovcalNet database. Hence the sample 
dataset included in this paper actually consists of 37 countries across 5 regions viz. East Asia 
and the Pacific (EAP), Latin America (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MNA), South 
Asia (SAS) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Moreover the dataset is unbalanced because the 
poverty surveys in these countries varied and also they were made on irregular frequency. 
The database includes three measures of poverty as follows: i) Poverty Headcount Index (H) 
measures percentage of the population living below the poverty line which set at one PPP 
dollar a day at the time of the survey; ii) Poverty Gap Index (PG) measures the ―depth of 
poverty‖ ignored by headcount index. Depth of poverty is the amount by which the average 
expenditure (or income) of the poor fall short of the poverty line. Poverty gap index 
measures, in percentage term, by how much the average expenditure (or income) of the poor 
fall below the poverty line. For example a 20 percent poverty gap means, the average 
expenditure (or income) of the poor household is 80% of the poverty line; iii) Squared 
Poverty Gap Index (SPG) which measures the ―severity of poverty‖ is the square of the 
poverty gap and is sensitive to the distribution of the poor below poverty line. A transfer of 
expenditure from poor to another poorer person will not change the headcount index or the 
poverty gap index, but will change the squared poverty gap index.  
 Data on other variables used for the purpose of econometric analysis in this paper 
were taken from other sources like World Development Indicators and Barro-Lee dataset. 
Please note that these data are available as continuous time series from 1960, except for 
Barro-Lee average years of schooling and average life expectancy data which are available 
from 1980 – 2007 but with regular breaks. Data on these variables are taken as five year 
averages corresponding to the year when the survey was made for the poverty and inequality 
data in PovcalNet Database. For example, if the household expenditure (or income) surveys 
for Bangladesh were carried out in the following years of 1981, 1984 and 1990, then data on 
other variables used in the econometric model such as those of remittances, trade, or 
schooling, etc are taken as preceding five year average values corresponding to the survey 
years. 
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 As a preliminary inspection of the data subset used for this, the three measures of 
poverty and remittances as ratio of GDP are graphed together to find it if there are any 
interesting dynamics. Note that the dataset is collapsed for the 37 countries and the average 
values across all countries over the time period 1980 – 2006 is graphed and presented in 
Figure 7.1. Several interesting findings emerge from graphs. Firstly, the dynamics of poverty 
measured as headcount (H), poverty gap (PG) and squared poverty gap (SPG) have been  
  
volatile throughout this sample period. For example, poverty headcount index which was as 
high as 60 percent in the sample in 1980, fell to as low as 8 percent in 1985 and then rose 
back to just above 40 percent in 1987. This volatile trend continues till 2006 when the 
percentage of poor people below poverty line is at around 5 percent. The dynamics for other 
measures of poverty, PG and SPG are almost similar. On average, the long term trends in all 
three poverty measures are falling. The dynamics of remittances flow into these economies is 
not volatile compared to that of poverty measures, and the long term is increasing. However, 
the second interesting finding in Figure 7.1 is the countercyclical pattern which is observed 
between remittances and poverty: the years when remittances go up, poverty falls and vice 
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versa. Especially conspicuous is the year 1987 when remittances ratio rises from an average 
of around 1 percent to 8 percent, poverty headcount falls from 60 percent to 8 percent, the 
depth of poverty (PG) falls from 25 percent to 3 percent, and severity of poverty (SPG) falls 
from 13 percent to 3 percent. Afterwards when remittances ratios fall to under 2 percent, all 
poverty measures go up. This countercyclical trend is observed throughout the sample period 
between remittances ratio and all measures of poverty which leads to hypothesis that these 
two variables are negatively linked, as has been propounded in earlier studies. To inspect if 
any such negative correlations exist, simple regression lines are fitted between remittances 
ratio and the three measures of poverty including a 95 percent confidence interval for the 
fitted lines and in Figure 7.2 the three graphs are combined and exhibited.  
 
It can be seen from Figure 7.2 that the relationship between remittances and poverty is 
negative as depicted by the simple regression lines fitted through the scatter plot. The fitted 
line is well within the 95 percent confidence interval.   
The preliminary inspection of the sample dataset including the 37 high remittances 
economies shows that a negative relationship exists between remittances ratio and the three 
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measures of poverty. The challenge is to develop an appropriate econometric model which 
will quantify this relationship by controlling for country specific heterogeneity present in the 
sample and controlling for bi-directional causality that may plague the relationship between 
remittances and poverty. 
7.5 Econometric Methodology and Expected Relationship 
 The econometric methodology adopted in this paper is primarily based on the poverty 
models of Ravallion (1997), and Ravallion and Chen (1997) which are also adopted in 
Adams and Page (2005) and Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009. The poverty equation estimated 
is as follows: 
 
itti
itititit
u
REMRATbGINIbPCYbbP


                                                                                  
)log()log()log()log( 3210
  (4) 
The dependent and independent variables are same as those described earlier in reference to 
equation (1). All three measures of poverty are utilised in estimating equation (4). However, 
unlike previous papers which only control for regional effects, i  is included in the 
regression to control for the country specific fixed effects, and t  included to control for the 
fixed time effect. The expected sign for the coefficient b1, the income elasticity of poverty, is 
< 0, as higher income means less people below poverty line. On the other hand, the expected 
sign for the coefficient b2 is  > 0 because a rise in inequality will push some people below 
poverty line. The expected sign of b3, the coefficient of the variable of interest which is 
remittances, is a priori < 0. Remittances are usually sent out as compensatory transfers by the 
migrants to their family members that augments the income sources of the recipient 
households, relax their credit constraints and enable them to undertake additional 
expenditures on education and health after having met the basic consumption requirements. 
All these point to an expected negative coefficient on log(REMRAT). With these 
expectations, equation (4) will be estimated for three measures of poverty and each poverty 
measure will be estimated with OLS first, then country fixed effects included and finally both 
country and time fixed effects included.  
 The problem with the estimation of equation (4) is the possibility of bias arising from 
the bi-directional causality between poverty and remittances. For instance, just as remittances 
can lead to the reduction of poverty for the recipient households, poverty itself can be driving 
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the direction of remittances either ways. The problem is mitigated in Adams and Page (2005) 
by using instrumental variable technique, and in Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) by using a 
3SLS system estimator. This possibility of reverse causation is also acknowledged in this 
paper and a system estimation procedure based on the seemingly unrelated regression 
estimator (SURE) is adopted which not only allows for the simultaneity between poverty and 
remittances and allows both to be jointly determined, but also allows for the error terms of 
the poverty and remittances equations (i.e. equations 5.1 and 5.2) to be contemporaneously 
correlated. The system to be estimated is as follows: 
 
itij
itititit
uREGIONb
REMRATbGINIbPCYbbP


)(                                                                              
)log()log()log()log(
4
3210
 (5.1) 
itijititit
itititit
itititit
vREGIONbREMRATbPLIFEb
PEDUbXRATbTRATb
LIFEbEDUbPbbREMRAT



 )()log()log()log(      
)log()log()()(                           
)log()log()log()log(
1411312
11109
8765
 (5.2) 
In (5.1) and (5.2), poverty and remittances are both endogenous. The parameters b0 – b14 are 
estimated as a system using SURE. Note the differences in this system compared to those in 
equations (3.1) – (3.2). As both poverty and remittances can have differential regional effects, 
regional dummies are added to both these equations. Whilst the variables included in 
equation (5.1) are same as those in equation (3.1), there are major differences in terms of the 
variables included in the second equations of the system. In (5.2) the logic for the inclusion of 
the appropriate variables comes from the literature of motivations to remit. EDUit  represent 
average years of schooling for the percentage of population more than 25 years of age and it 
is included as measure to proxy human capital. LIFEit measures the average life expectancy 
of the population which is another measure of human capital. While the EDUit  variable has 
been added in estimations of the determinants of remittances before such as in Adams (2006), 
Adams and Page (2005) and Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009), no studies have had the health 
factor included . TRATit represent trade openness and has been included in previous studies. 
XRATit is the nominal exchange rate measured as domestic currency of the recipient 
economies per US dollar, and this variable is included here for the first time as determinant of 
remittances. Equation (5.2) also include two different interaction terms, those between 
education and poverty ( itit PEDU  ) and between health and poverty ( itit PLIFE  ) to allow 
for non-linearity in the remittances equation.  
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 With regard to expected signs of the estimated parameters, the following discussion is 
useful. The expected signs of b1 – b3 are same as those for equation (4) discussed before. For 
equation (5.2), the expected sign of the b6 which is the coefficient on poverty may be positive. 
Controlling education and health and policy factors, countries with higher rates of poverty 
may have more people who want to migrate and send more remittances (Adams, 2006 and 
Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh, 2009). On the other hand, it is also possible that b6 is < 0 because 
higher rates of poverty mean less people will be able undertake the higher cost to migrate, 
and as a result there will be less out migration and less flow of inward remittances. With 
respect to the sign of b7 and b8, which are the coefficients on education and health, the 
expected signs are > 0 because human capital theory suggests that more educated and 
healthier people are more likely to migrate (Becker, 1993; Harris and Todaro, 1970) and thus 
send more remittances. On the other hand higher educational attainment and improved health 
outcome may serve as an indication of development in the source country, and lower the need 
to seek employment through migration and thus causing less inflow of remittances. As a 
result it also possible that signs of b7 and b8 are negative. Openness in the commodities trade 
is an indication of integration of the migration sending economies with rest of the world. For 
this reason, expected sign of b9 is > 0. The expected sign of b10 < 0. The reason is, an increase 
in XRAT means nominal appreciation of the US dollar, which will lead to a fall in remittances 
because the same US dollar will be able send more money home.  Lagged remittances should 
have a positive estimated coefficient (b14 > 0) because previous period‘s remittances are a 
significant predictor for current period‘s remittances. The signs of the interaction terms are 
indeterminate a priori. Their respective coefficients b11 and b12 can be interpreted as what is 
the impact on remittances if education attainment and health outcome rise among the poor 
people. The indeterminacy of the expected signs regarding b11 and b12 arise because of the 
uncertainty associated with the probability of out migration among the poor people as they 
become healthier and more educated.  
  
7.6 Econometric Results 
In this section the econometric estimations of the models outlined in equation (4) and the 
system estimation of equations (5.1) and (5.2) are presented.  At first, equation (4) 
endogenizing poverty is estimated where the dependent variable includes all three measures, 
i.e. poverty headcount, poverty gap and its square. The results are presented in Table 7.2. For 
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each measures of poverty, three regressions – OLS and fixed effects with country and time 
effects – are estimated.  
Column (1) in Table 7.2 presents results for the OLS regression of the poverty 
headcount on income, inequality and remittances without controlling for country and time 
effects. Note that equation (4) is a log-log model, as a result estimated coefficients in all the 
regressions measure elasticity of poverty with respect to the independent variables. The OLS 
estimates of the elasticities of the regressors in column (1) conform to their expected signs. 
Elasticities of poverty headcount with respect to income (PCY) and remittances (REMRAT) 
are negative; while with inequality (GINI) is negative.  All of them are significantly different 
from zero at 1% level. Poverty headcount elasticity of remittances is -0.19 which falls within 
the estimated range reported in previous studies (see Table 7.1). The OLS estimates may 
suffer from bias because they do not take into account of the country specific differences 
arising from differences in culture, geography or other fixed factors like language. To control 
for all these fixed factors, column (2) present the regression of equation (4) including country 
fixed effects and the inclusion of the fixed effects explain a large proportion of the variation 
in data. The estimated signs of the elasticites of the independent variables do change from 
those in column (1), but the adjusted R
2
 jumps up to 0.89 from 0.65 and SER falls to 0.46 
from 0.76, meaning the OLS estimates are biased because of omitting country fixed factors. 
However, the bias is not very high as the magnitude of the poverty headcount elasticities of 
income (PCY), inequality (GINI) and remittances (REMRAT) are similar to those of OLS 
estimates and they are all significantly different from zero at 5% level. The F-statistics to test 
the hypothesis that country fixed effects are redundant is quite high, clearly rejected the 
hypothesis.  It is important to note here that, at first the fixed effect regression was carried out 
assuming that errors have standard properties. But postestimation diagnostic suggested that 
there is strong evidence for groupwise heteroskedasticity
3
. To account for this robust standard 
errors are used across all fixed effect regressions. The poverty headcount elasticity of 
remittances is -0.15 which is not much different from that of column (1). Country fixed 
effects control for the factors which are different across countries but fixed in time. In order 
to also control for the factors which are different across time period but fixed across 
countries, equation (4) is estimated using both country and time fixed effects and the results 
are presented in column (3). The estimated elasticties of income (PCY) and inequality (GINI) 
                                                          
3
 The test used was that of xttest3 – a user written STATA routine by Baum (2001). 
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Table 7.2 
Poverty and Remittances 
Estimation of Eq. 4; Unbalanced Panel 1980 – 2006 
Independent 
Variables: 
Dependent Variables: 
log(Poverty Headcount) log(Poverty Gap) 
 
log(Squared Poverty Gap) 
(1) 
 
 
OLS 
(2) 
 
Fixed Country 
Effects 
(3) 
Fixed Country 
and Time 
Effects 
(4) 
 
 
OLS 
(5) 
 
Fixed Country 
Effects 
(6) 
Fixed Country 
and Time 
Effects 
(7) 
 
 
OLS 
(8) 
 
Fixed Country 
Effects 
(9) 
Fixed Country 
and Time 
Effects 
log(PCY) 
-1.139 
(-16.88)*** 
-0.965 
(-8.92)*** 
-0.420 
(-1.86)* 
-1.410 
(-15.69)*** 
-1.348 
(-8.71)*** 
-0.812 
(-2.49)** 
-1.467 
(-14.99)*** 
-1.719 
(-6.21)*** 
-1.455 
(-3.94)*** 
log(GINI) 
1.050 
(3.85)*** 
1.078 
(2.05)** 
1.257 
(1.96)* 
2.143 
(5.90)*** 
1.827 
(1.77)* 
2.348 
(2.10)** 
2.785 
(7.07)*** 
3.142 
(2.97)** 
4.418 
(3.09)*** 
Log(REMRAT) 
-0.190 
(-5.17)*** 
-0.150 
(-5.90)*** 
-0.060 
(-1.26) 
-0.255 
(-5.22)*** 
-0.190 
(-4.43)*** 
-0.090 
(-1.51) 
-0.246 
(-4.63)*** 
-0.201 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.122 
(-1.89)* 
Constant 
5.818 
(6.41)*** 
4.672 
(2.31)** 
0.608 
(0.31) 
2.074 
(1.72)* 
3.105 
(0.79) 
-2.138 
(-0.69) 
-0.682 
(-0.52) 
-0.102 
(-0.03) 
-6.384 
(-1.72)* 
TN   203 203 203 203 203 203 200 200 200 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.655 0.898 0.884 0.603 0.831 0.838 0.561 0.826 0.834 
SER 0.764 0.458 0.441 0.597 0.659 0.644 1.098 0.691 0.676 
F-Stat 
(P-value) 
125.91 
(0.00) 
38.06 
(0.00) 
25.34 
(0.00) 
100.56 
(0.00) 
27.05 
(0.00) 
17.62 
(0.00) 
85.69 
(0.00) 
25.85 
(0.00) 
16.81 
(0.00) 
Country 
Dummy 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
F-Stat: Country 
fixed effect = 0 
(P-value) 
 
11.19*** 
(0.00) 
11.22*** 
(0.00) 
 
8.85*** 
(0.00) 
8.60*** 
(0.00) 
 
9.53*** 
(0.00) 
9.44*** 
(0.00) 
Time Dummy No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
F-Stat: Time 
fixed effect = 0 
(P-value) 
  
1.51 
(0.07)* 
  
1.32 
(0.16) 
  
1.29 
(0.17) 
Note: t-statistics on parentheses. ***,**,&* denote significance at 1%,5%&10% respectively. Standard errors in fixed effect regressions are robust.  
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continue to be positive and negative respectively while remaining as significantly different 
from zero like as before. Whilst the poverty headcount elasticity of remittances is still 
negative as expected, but it remains no longer significant. The F-tests for the country and 
times effects show that they both are individually significantly different from zero. However, 
the adjusted R
2
 is slightly lower in column (3) which means adding the fixed time factors 
does not add in terms of the explanation of the variation in data. As a result column (2) 
results are most reliable. 
Next, in columns (4) - (6) the estimated impact of the independent variables are 
calculated on the ‗depth of poverty‘ as measured by poverty gap. In column (5) the OLS 
estimates of equation (4) without controlling for fixed country or time effects are presented. 
The results are similar to those obtained in column (1) – the elasticity of poverty gap with 
respect to PCY and GINI are respectively negative and positive and they are both 
significantly different from zero at 1 percent. The estimated poverty elasticity of REMRAT is 
negative and highly significant and the magnitude implies that a 1 percent increase in 
remittances will reduce poverty gap by -0.25 percentage points. However, the OLS estimates 
may be omitting critical country specific fixed factors and thus giving biased estimates, 
which is why it is re-estimated including country fixed effects. The results are reported in 
column (5).  It turns out that country fixed factors explain a lot of variation in the data as it 
can be seen from the increase in adjusted R
2
 from 0.60 to 0.83, although SER has gone up a 
bit. The corresponding F-test is strongly in favour of using country fixed effects. The 
estimated poverty gap elasticity of both PCY and REMRAT are negative as before and they 
are significantly deferent from zero at 1 percent; while that of GINI is positive and significant 
at 10 percent. The estimated elasticity of remittances imply that a 1 percent increase in 
REMRAT will decrease poverty gap by 0.19 percentage point, which is close to estimates 
reported in previous literature. In column (6) time fixed effects are added to the regression to 
see if the results improve any further. Although the adjusted R
2
 increases by a very thin 
margin coupled with a marginal drop in SER, the F-statistics on time dummy is not 
significantly different from zero. Hence the most reliable estimate on the determinants of 
poverty gap is the regression with only country fixed effects as reported in column (5). 
Lastly, in columns (7) – (9), the effects of income, inequality and remittances are 
estimated on ‗severity of poverty‘ which is measured by squared poverty gap. The main 
difference that can be observed in these regressions is that the magnitude of the estimated 
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elasticity of inequality (GINI) is higher than its previous values calculated in either poverty 
headcount or in poverty gap. The reason is that squared poverty gap is sensitive to income 
distribution. An expenditure transfer from a poor to a poorer person does not change the 
number of poor people according to headcount or poverty gap measure, but it changes the 
amount of ultra poor measured by squared poverty gap. Other than this aspect, the basic 
results in column (7) – (9) are quite similar to the previous ones. Column (7) presents the 
OLS estimates without including any fixed effects. The estimated coefficients on PCY and 
REMRAT are negative as usual and they are also significant at 1 percent. The elasticity GINI 
is also positive and significant. In column (8) fixed country effects are added to the regression 
to control for the country specific heterogeneity. It is observed that inclusion of the country 
effects improves the explanatory power of the model which is shown in an marked increase 
in adjusted R
2
 and a fall in SER. The F-statistics for the country dummy is also highly 
significant rejecting the redundant country fixed effect hypothesis. Moreover, after including 
the country fixed effects, the signs of the estimated elasticities of these variables remain same 
and they are also significantly different from zero at 5 percent. The squared poverty gap 
elasticity of remittances is -0.20 which is close to previous estimates. Column (9) includes 
both time and country effects to the regression and this do not improve the modelling a lot. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients remain unchanged and they are all significantly 
different from zero at 10 percent. However, while the country dummies are significantly 
different from zero, time dummies are not. This leaves, column (8) to be the most reliable 
estimates. 
So far, the poverty reduction elasticities of per capita income (PCY), income 
inequality (GINI) and remittances to GDP (REMRAT) are estimated for three measures of 
poverty—poverty headcount, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap in three alternative 
specifications for each of these measures. The specifications included OLS, fixed country 
effects, and fixed country and time effects. The computed standard errors are robust to 
groupwise heteroskedasticity. The results suggest that, for each measures of poverty, the 
regressions with only the country fixed effects are most reliable. According to this, income 
and remittances reduce all measures of poverty; while income inequality causes these three 
measures of poverty to rise. The poverty reduction elasticities of the variable of interest, 
REMRAT, are  -0.15, -0.19, and -0.20 for poverty headcount, poverty gap and squared 
poverty gap respectively. It can be seen that the effect of remittance is highest for the most 
severe forms of poverty. 
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The analysis carried out thus far assumes that remittances are exogenous in the 
poverty equations. But in reality they may be endogenous. As discussed in the previous 
section, just as much remittances can have its impact on poverty; it can in turn be determined 
by the level of poverty. Previous studies have controlled for this using instrumental variables 
or system estimation technique. The issue here is tackled by a system estimation method 
where both remittances and poverty are simultaneous determined. The systems of equations 
used for estimation were described in section 7.5 through equations (5.1) and (5.2). 
Specifying this way corrects for the endogeneity bias and allows seeing the effect remittances 
on poverty as well as that of poverty on remittances at the same time. The results of the 
system estimation using the seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) estimator are presented 
in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. However, Table 7.3 presents the SURE estimations without adding any 
regional effects; whereas in Table 7.4 the estimation presented include regional effects. 
Table 7.3 is organised in six columns where two successive columns refer to the 
system estimation of equations (5.1) and (5.2) for alternative measures of poverty. For 
example columns (1) and (2) refer to the poverty headcount measure; columns (3) and (4) 
refer to poverty gap measure and the last two columns refer to the measure of squared 
poverty gap. In column (1) it can be seen, similar to the fixed effect estimates that the poverty 
headcount elasticity of PCY and REMRAT are negative and that of GINI is positive. All 
these variables are significantly different from zero at 1 percent. The magnitudes of these 
estimates are higher than those in the fixed effects meaning that the actual effects were 
underestimated due to the simultaneity bias. The poverty headcount elasticity of remittances 
is -0.31 which is not very different from those found in literature. Turning to column (2) 
where remittances are determined, it can be seen that the estimated elasticity of poverty 
headcount is negative with remittances. This means, controlling for other factors, countries 
with higher poverty headcount ratio will have lower remittances. This finding, i.e. a negative 
poverty headcount coefficient, is also reported in Adams (2006) – despite the expectation of 
positive coefficient because higher level of poverty means more people migrating and hence 
higher remittance. Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) reported a positive coefficient and gave 
the above rationale for their findings. The justification for the negative elasticity found 
between poverty and remittances in this paper is that, with higher level of poverty less people 
are able to undertake the cost of undertaking migration, resulting in fewer emigration and 
lesser remittances. The estimated sign of the remittances elasticity of EDU is positive 
meaning higher level of education is associated with more remittances, however the 
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estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero. On the contrary the remittances 
elasticity of LIFE is negative which means remittances fall with a rise in average life 
expectancy of the population. Also to be noted is that the health factor is a highly significant 
determinant of remittances. The policy variables such as trade openness (TRAT) and nominal 
exchange rate (XRAT) are not significant determinants in the remittances equation. The 
interesting analysis in remittances equation comes from the interpretation of the elasticity of 
remittances with respect to two interaction terms which are between education and health 
with poverty headcount. The reasons for including the interaction terms are to allow for some 
additional dimensions by extending the analysis to the level where appropriate question asked 
is what happens to remittances if the level of education and health rise among the poor 
people. From column (2) it can be seen that remittances elasticity of rising education of the 
poor people (EDU×H) is positive but not significant. The F-stat testing the joint hypothesis 
that EDU and interaction term between (EDU×H) is zero is rejected. The effect of improved 
health conditions of the poor people (LIFE×H) has a positive elasticity with respect to 
remittances and the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero. The 
interpretation is, when the health outcome of the percentage of population living under the 
poverty line improves, they are better able to find an employment outside home country and 
have more chance to migrate, and send more remittances. On the other hand, referring to the 
household level evidences in section 7.2, it is found that remittances sent are used for 
improving health outcome in recipient family, which means there is a direct positive 
relationship between health outcome and remittances, and the evidence in this paper show 
that this relationship holds true when the recipient household is relatively poorer. The F-
statistics testing the joint hypothesis whether LIFE and (LIFE×PG) are equal to zero is 
strongly rejected. Lagged remittances are a positive and significant determinant of current 
flow of remittances. 
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7.3, the SURE estimation is presented where the 
measure of poverty used is poverty gap. It can be seen from column (3) that the poverty gap 
elasticity of PCY and REMRAT are negative; while that of GINI is positive and all of them 
are significantly different from zero at 1 percent. Compared to their counterpart estimates in 
the country fixed model, the estimated elasticities are large. In particular, the poverty gap 
elasticity of remittances is -0.42 which is one the highest to have been estimated in this paper 
as well as in the literature. In column (4) the remittances equation is estimation, the estimated 
sign of PG is negative and significant, meaning that increases in the ‗depth of poverty‘ will 
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cause remittances to fall because less people will be able undertake the cost of migration. The 
education variable has a positive sign but not significant. However, health again turns out to 
be significant determinant of remittances with an estimated negative and significant elasticity 
of LIFE meaning overall improvement in health indicators of the economy leads to a fall in 
remittances. The estimated elasticity of the interaction term (LIFE×PG) is positive and 
significantly different from zero. This is interpreted as when the health outcome improves for 
a cohort of people at some particular level of poverty gap, remittances rise because they are 
now better able to find employment and migrate. The F-statistics testing the joint hypothesis 
whether LIFE and (LIFE×PG) are zero is strongly rejected. One interesting finding here is 
that although the education factor (EDU) is insignificant on its own, the elasticity of the 
interacting term between EDU and (EDU×PG) with respect to remittances turns out to be 
negative and significantly different from zero at 5 percent. This has an interesting 
interpretation which is, as the education level rise in the cohort of poor people at a particular 
level of poverty gap, remittances fall. This is because they are now more capable of finding a 
job within their home country and have a lesser need to migrate. The F-statistics testing the 
joint hypothesis whether EDU and (EDU×PG) are zero is strongly rejected. Among the 
policy variables, only exchange rate (XRAT) is significant with an estimated negative 
elasticity with respect to remittances. This makes sense because an appreciation of US dollar 
(i.e. increase in XRAT) means more local currencies can be remitted with the same or even 
less dollar. Trade openness has no effect on remittances sent whereas lagged remittances are 
a positive and significant determinant of current flow of remittances. 
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 7.3, the SURE estimation is presented where the 
measure of poverty used is squared poverty gap. It can be seen in column (5) that the 
elasticities of per capita income (PCY) and remittances (REMRAT) with regard to squared 
poverty gap is negative and significant as usual. The magnitude of estimated elasticity of 
REMRAT is -0.36, which is lower than that estimated in column (3) corresponding to poverty 
gap measure. The elasticity of GINI with regard to squared poverty gap is 3.072 which is the 
highest compared to those estimated for poverty headcount and poverty gap. This is due to 
the fact that squared poverty gap measure of poverty is more sensitive to income distribution.  
From column (6) it can be seen that squared poverty gap (SPG), health (LIFE) and exchange 
rate (XRAT) are significant determinants of remittances with estimated elasticities which are 
negative. The interpretations are similar to those discussed for the other measures of poverty 
viz. poverty headcount and poverty gap. The interaction terms between EDU and LIFE with 
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SPG are also significant. For the cohort of poor people at a particular level of poverty gap 
squared, increase in their education leads to a fall in remittances, while a similar increase in 
their health outcome leads to a rise in remittances. The F-statistics rejects the hypotheses that 
EDU and LIFE and their interacting terms are equal to zero. As with the previous measure, 
lagged remittances are still found to be significant determinant of current flow of remittances.  
Table 7.3 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) Estimation 
Of System of Equations 5.1 and 5.2 (without regional effects) 
Independent 
Variables 
Poverty Headcount (H) Poverty Gap (PG) Squared Poverty Gap 
(SPG) 
(1) 
log(H) 
 
(2) 
log(REMRAT) 
(3) 
log(PG) 
(4) 
log(REMRAT) 
(5) 
log(SPG) 
(6) 
log(REMRAT) 
log(PCY) -1.312 
(-26.88)*** 
 -1.612 
(-23.99)*** 
 -1.610 
(-22.49)*** 
 
log(GINI) 1.247 
(6.69)*** 
 2.454 
(9.54)*** 
 3.072 
(11.33)*** 
 
log(REMRAT) -0.311 
(-10.85)*** 
 -0.420 
(-10.64)*** 
 -0.363 
(-8.64)*** 
 
log(H)  -8.995 
(-4.01)*** 
    
log(PG)    -7.507 
(-4.25)*** 
  
log(SPG)      -8.057 
(-4.85)*** 
log(EDU)  0.185 
(0.36) 
 0.149 
(0.50) 
 0.120 
(0.53) 
log(LIFE)  -8.858 
(-4.16)*** 
 -5.685 
(-4.33)*** 
 -4.313 
(-4.38)*** 
log(TRAT)  0.039 
(0.30) 
 0.080 
(0.62) 
 0.148 
(1.14) 
log(XRAT)  -0.022 
(-1.30) 
 -0.032 
(-1.93)* 
 -0.036 
(-2.14)** 
log(EDU)×log(H)  -0.181 
(-1.23) 
    
log(LIFE)×log(H)  2.102 
(3.77)*** 
    
log(EDU)×log(PG)    -0.248 
(-2.16)** 
  
log(LIFE)×log(PG)    1.796 
(4.07)*** 
  
log(EDU)×log(SPG)      -0.333 
(-3.15)*** 
log(LIFE)×log(SPG)      1.981 
(4.72)*** 
log(REMRATt-1)  0.398 
(15.29)*** 
 0.403 
(15.55)*** 
 0.407 
(15.47)*** 
F-stat EDU and 
interaction = 0 
 4.28*** 
 
 5.68***  7.87*** 
F-stat LIFE and 
interaction = 0 
 9.00*** 
 
 9.45***  11.59*** 
Constant 5.851 
(9.02)*** 
36.56 
(4.26)*** 
1.724 
(1.93)* 
22.696 
(4.29)*** 
-1.164 
(-1.24) 
16.731 
(4.25)*** 
N 132 132 132 132 129 129 
RMSE 0.741 0.922 1.022 0.922 1.062 0.926 
R2 0.664 0.500 0.599 0.499 0.561 0.492 
F-Statistic 280.42*** 55.93*** 214.88*** 56.17*** 177.56 51.74 
Note: t-statistics on parentheses; ***,**&* represent significance at 1%,5%&10% respectively. 
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The estimates of Table 7.3 may suffer from bias because of not including the fixed 
effects due to regional factors. In order to account for these omitted factors and also to check 
the robustness for the estimates of in Table 7.3, four regional dummies – East Asia and the 
Pacific (EAP), Latin America (LAC), South Asia (SAS), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) – are 
added to the system estimates for all three measures of poverty. The resulting new estimates 
are presented in Table 7.4.  
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 7.4 present the SURE estimation controlling for reginal 
factors using poverty headcount as the relevant measure for poverty. PCY and REMRAT 
have negative and significant poverty reduction elasticities. Poverty headcount elasticity of 
remittances is estimated to be -0.27 which slightly less than its counterpart in Table 7.3. In 
column (2) it can be seen that, poverty headcount and LIFE are significant determinant of 
remittances with negative elasticities.  Trade openness and lagged remittances have estimated 
positive elasticities which are significant. The elasticity of LIFE and its interaction term with 
poverty headcount is negative and significant as in its counterpart in Table 7.3. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7.4, present the results of SURE estimations including 
regional dummies when the measure for poverty used is poverty gap or the ‗depth of 
poverty‘. Regarding the elasticity of poverty gap with respect to PCY, REMRAT and GINI, 
there are no changes in signs of estimated coefficients and they are all significant at 1 
percent. The poverty gap elasticity of remittances is estimated at -0.38 which high but as 
much as it is for its counterpart in Table 7.3. It can be seen in column (4) that poverty gap and 
health are determinants of remittances because the estimated elasticities PG and LIFE are 
negative and significant, meaning that a rise in poverty gap index and an improvement in 
health outcome will lead to fall in remittances. For the first time, education has entered as a 
positive and significant determinant of remittances, meaning increases in education leads to 
more remittances. Lagged remittances along with trade openness also remain as positive and 
significant determinant of remittances.  The two interaction terms, EDU and LIFE with 
poverty gap are also significant.  
In columns (5) and (6) the SURE estimations with regional effects are presented when 
the measure for poverty used is squared poverty gap (SPG) or the ‗severity of poverty‘. It can 
be seen that PCY and REMRAT still have negative elasticities with respect to SPG and they 
are significant at 1 percent. The estimated SPG reduction elasticity of REMRAT is -0.29. The 
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GINI coefficient is no longer significant though it still retains the correct sign. In column (6) 
it can be seen that squared poverty gap, health, education, trade openness and lagged  
Table 7.4 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) Estimation 
Of System of Equations 5.1 and 5.2 (with regional effects) 
Independent 
Variables 
Poverty Headcount (H) Poverty Gap (PG) Squared Poverty Gap 
(SPG) 
(1) 
log(H) 
 
(2) 
log(REMRAT) 
(3) 
log(PG) 
(4) 
log(REMRAT) 
(5) 
log(SPG) 
(6) 
log(REMRAT) 
log(PCY) -1.448 
(-21.90)*** 
 -1.874 
(-20.76)*** 
 -1.989 
(-23.38)*** 
 
log(GINI) 0.766 
(2.83)*** 
 1.305 
(3.52)*** 
 0.288 
(0.82) 
 
log(REMRAT) -0.273 
(-8.89)*** 
 -0.383 
(-9.14)*** 
 -0.290 
(-7.25)*** 
 
log(H)  -9.838 
(-4.48)*** 
    
log(PG)    -8.708 
(-5.00)*** 
  
log(SPG)      -11.005 
(-6.92)*** 
log(EDU)  0.201 
(0.41) 
 0.563 
(1.89)* 
 0.865 
(3.75)*** 
log(LIFE)  -9.459 
(-4.66)*** 
 -6.726 
(-5.14)*** 
 -6.448 
(-6.42)*** 
log(TRAT)  0.328 
(2.36)** 
 0.320 
(2.37)** 
 0.366 
(2.79)*** 
log(XRAT)  0.008 
(0.55) 
 0.001 
(0.07) 
 0.010 
(0.62) 
log(EDU)×log(H)  -0.063 
(-0.45) 
    
log(LIFE)×log(H)  2.275 
(4.20)*** 
    
log(EDU)×log(PG)    -0.244 
(-2.21)** 
  
log(LIFE)×log(PG)    2.091 
(4.83)*** 
  
log(EDU)×log(SPG)      -0.472 
(-4.65)*** 
log(LIFE)×log(SPG)      2.742 
(6.83)*** 
log(REMRATt-1)  0.351 
(13.88)*** 
 0.353 
(14.01)*** 
 0.338 
(13.49)*** 
EAP 0.466 
(2.43)** 
-0.783 
(-3.06)*** 
0.276 
(1.06) 
-0.947 
(-3.84)*** 
0.499 
(2.04)** 
-1.382 
(-5.48)*** 
LAC 0.734 
(3.77)*** 
-0.141 
(-0.66) 
1.120 
(4.20)*** 
-0.100 
(-0.47) 
2.284 
(9.05)*** 
-0.293 
(-1.31) 
SAS 0.347 
(1.64)* 
0.797 
(2.98)*** 
0.100 
(0.35) 
0.536 
(2.10)** 
-0.003 
(-0.01) 
0.186 
(0.73) 
SSA 0.025 
(0.11) 
0.245 
(0.76) 
-0.087 
(-0.28) 
0.091 
(0.29) 
0.454 
(1.55) 
-0.239 
(-0.77) 
F-stat EDU and 
interaction = 0 
 0.10  2.43*  10.95*** 
F-stat LIFE and 
interaction = 0 
 11.07***  13.48***  25.01*** 
F-stat Regional 
dummy =0 
6.79*** 16.55*** 9.59*** 16.89*** 37.01*** 23.07*** 
Constant 8.244 
(7.52)*** 
38.899 
(4.75)*** 
7.390 
(4.93)*** 
26.358 
(5.03)*** 
10.949 
(7.76)*** 
24.626 
(6.15)*** 
N 132 132 132 132 129 129 
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Table 7.4 Continued 
RMSE 0.716 0.860 0.978 0.857 0.910 0.845 
R2 0.690 0.568 0.636 0.572 0.681 0.582 
F-Statistic 134.94 48.14 106.86 48.68 126.28 49.44 
Contemporaneous 
Corr.  error terms 
 log(h) & log(Remrat) log(pg) & log(Remrat) log(spg) & log(Remrat) 
0.202 0.199 0.200 
B-P Test for 
Independence of 
error terms 
(P-Value) 
5.370 
(0.020) 
5.217 
(0.022) 
5.166 
(0.023) 
Note: t-statistics on parentheses; ***,**&* represent significance at 1%,5%&10% respectively. 
remittances are all significant determinants of remittances where elasticities of the former two 
are negative but those of the latter three are positive. The coefficients of the interaction terms 
between EDU and LIFE with SPG are also significant where it is negative for education and 
positive for health. 
The distinguished features to be noted in columns (1) – (6) are that, after controlling 
for the regional effects, for each of the six regressions in Table 7.4 has a lower RMSE and 
higher R
2
 compared to their counterparts in Table 7.3. This means that the estimations have 
improved after having controlled for the regional fixed factors and hence these are the 
preferred and more reliable estimates. Finally, note that at the end of Table 7.4, the 
contemporaneous correlation of the error terms of equations 5.1 and 5.2 are presented along 
with the Breusch-Pagan test for the independence of the residuals. There are sizable 
correlations between the error terms between each poverty and remittances equations and the 
B-P test rejects the independence of these residuals at 5% level. This result strongly justifies 
the use of SURE estimator. 
 It was mentioned before, when presenting the panel estimations, that the data 
exhibited strong groupwise heteroskedasticity. As a result robust standard errors reported for 
the panel estimations in Table 7.2.  However, the routine used in STATA to estimate the 
seemingly unrelated regression in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, impose homoskedasticity on the 
standard errors. Unfortunately, there is no option available in the STATA routine to allow the 
errors to be heteroskedastic in the SURE regression. Nevertheless, standard errors which are 
robust to heteroskedasticy  can be obtain for SURE estimator by bootstrapping. Resampling 
over the individuals it provides standard errors that are valid under the weaker assumption 
that jjijiij XuuE   ,)|(  but it continues to hold the assumption of independence over 
individuals. The default STATA bootstrap replication is 50 to minimize computation time. 
However, given that the sample size in this paper is relatively small, 600 bootstrap 
replications were used. Thus using bootstrap, heteroskeadsticity robust standard errors are 
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reported for the SURE estimations in Table 7.5. It can be seen that, in the wake of 
bootstrapping some variables have become insignificant, but the main conclusion drawn in 
from Table 7.4 still remains valid. 
Table 7.5 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) Estimation 
Of System of Equations 5.1 and 5.2 with Bootstrap Standard Error 
Independent 
Variables 
Poverty Headcount (H) Poverty Gap (PG) Squared Poverty Gap 
(SPG) 
(1) 
log(H) 
 
(2) 
log(REMRAT) 
(3) 
log(PG) 
(4) 
log(REMRAT) 
(5) 
log(SPG) 
(6) 
log(REMRAT) 
log(PCY) -1.448 
(-10.31)*** 
 -1.874 
(-10.67)*** 
 -1.989 
(-10.59)*** 
 
log(GINI) 0.766 
(1.21) 
 1.305 
(1.53) 
 0.288 
(0.41) 
 
log(REMRAT) -0.273 
(-3.55)*** 
 -0.383 
(-3.63)*** 
 -0.290 
(-3.67)*** 
 
log(H)  -9.838 
(-2.19)** 
    
log(PG)    -8.708 
(-2.73)*** 
  
log(SPG)      -11.005 
(-3.66)*** 
log(EDU)  0.201 
(0.20) 
 0.563 
(1.02) 
 0.865 
(2.06)** 
log(LIFE)  -9.459 
(-2.11)** 
 -6.726 
(-2.63)*** 
 -6.448 
(-3.47)*** 
log(TRAT)  0.328 
(1.16) 
 0.320 
(1.10) 
 0.366 
(1.26) 
log(XRAT)  0.008 
(0.29) 
 0.001 
(0.04) 
 0.010 
(0.31) 
log(EDU)×log(H)  -0.063 
(-0.20) 
    
log(LIFE)×log(H)  2.275 
(2.04)** 
    
log(EDU)×log(PG)    -0.244 
(-1.07) 
  
log(LIFE)×log(PG)    2.091 
(2.62)*** 
  
log(EDU)×log(SPG)      -0.472 
(-2.29)** 
log(LIFE)×log(SPG)      2.742 
(3.60)*** 
log(REMRATt-1)  0.351 
(5.85)*** 
 0.353 
(5.90)*** 
 0.338 
(5.85)*** 
EAP 0.466 
(1.36) 
-0.783 
(-1.54) 
0.276 
(0.63) 
-0.947 
(-2.04)** 
0.499 
(1.11) 
-1.382 
(-3.06)*** 
LAC 0.734 
(1.92)* 
-0.141 
(-0.40) 
1.120 
(2.19)** 
-0.100 
(-0.29) 
2.284 
(4.71)*** 
-0.293 
(-0.76) 
SAS 0.347 
(1.14) 
0.797 
(1.58) 
0.100 
(0.26) 
0.536 
(1.18) 
-0.003 
(-0.01) 
0.186 
(0.42) 
SSA 0.025 
(0.07) 
0.245 
(0.43) 
-0.087 
(-0.19) 
0.091 
(0.16) 
0.454 
(0.90) 
-0.239 
(-0.40) 
Constant 8.244 
(3.01)*** 
38.899 
(2.16)** 
7.390 
(2.05)** 
26.358 
(2.57)*** 
10.949 
(3.24)*** 
24.626 
(3.35)*** 
N 132 132 132 132 129 129 
RMSE 0.709 0.846 0.968 0.843 0.901 0.830 
R2 0.690 0.568 0.636 0.572 0.681 0.582 
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7.7 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper, as mentioned in introduction, is to see, firstly, if remittances 
reduce poverty in the high remittance economies and secondly, to check for robustness of any 
such relationship that may exist by appropriately modelling the bi-directional mode of 
causality that is likely to persist in these two variables. In this paper the above objective is 
attained in the following way. First of all an OLS estimate of poverty and remittances is 
undertaken, and secondly, a SURE estimation of a system where poverty and remittances are 
both endogenous and simultaneously determined is carried out. A variety of specifications are 
estimated but it is found out that for the unidirectional mode, OLS estimation with fixed 
country effect gives the most the most reliable estimates. Similarly, for the bi-directional 
mode SURE estimation with regional effects provides the most reliable results. These results, 
for only those variables with significant coefficients are summarised in Table 7.6. The main 
conclusion is that controlling for country fixed factors, flow of remittances cause a fall in 
poverty for all its measures. This relationship remains robust even after allowing both poverty 
and remittances to be jointly determined in a system. The estimated poverty elasticities of  
Table 7.6 
Summary of Results 
Poverty and Remittance 
Poverty Elasticity of 
Remittances 
Poverty Measures 
Poverty Headcount Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap 
OLS – Fixed Country 
Effects 
-0.15 -0.19 -0.20 
SURE – Regional 
Effects 
-0.27 -0.38 -0.28 
 Determinants of Remittances 
Poverty -9.83 -8.71 -11.01 
Education -- 0.56 0.86 
Health -9.46 -6.73 -6.45 
Education*Poverty -- -0.24 -0.47 
Health*Poverty 2.27 2.09 2.74 
Trade Openness 0.33 0.32 0.36 
Lagged Remittance 0.35 0.35 0.34 
remittances are a bit higher in the SURE estimates compared to those in the OLS. However, 
these estimates are in line with the poverty reduction elasticities estimated in previous studies 
(see Table 7.2 for comparison). With respect to the determinants of remittances which are 
presented in the second part of the table, it is found that poverty, education, health, 
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interaction terms between education and health factor with poverty, trade openness and 
lagged remittances are significant.The signs of the estimated elasticities of these variables 
with respect remittances have been interpreted as follows. Firstly, increases in the level of 
poverty in the recipient countries will lead to a fall in remittances, simply because poorer 
people have a lesser financial capacity to migrate and send remittance. Similar result is 
reported in Adams (2006) though the coefficient was not significant.  Secondly, increase in 
education as measured by schooling years, is associated with higher remittances in some 
measures of poverty, because this allows for better migration opportunity. Adams and Page 
(2005) and Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) report similar findings in their papers. However, 
increase in education among the poor people lead to a fall in remittances, as shown by the 
estimated sign of interaction variable between education and poverty. This suggests that as 
the poor become more educated the need to migrate subside as they tend to find employment 
in their home country. Thirdly, increase in the health outcomes, as measured in average life 
expectancy, is associated with a fall in remittances. There can be two possible explanations. 
Improving health conditions leads to a better employment prospect at home and less need for 
migration. As household level evidences show remittances are used to for the purpose of 
improving health outcomes, improving health conditions may imply less need to remit by the 
migrant member of the family. However, the sign of the interaction term between health and 
poverty imply, when the health conditions rise among the poor, they are better to migrate and 
send more remittances back home.  
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